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Abstract 
 
What are the main reasons behind the regulation of political parties by contemporary 
constitutional practices? This article presents a framework for analysis which identifies types of 
justifications and actors involved in the process of regulation and their further influence on the 
outcomes of constitutionalization. The empirical focus is on the revelatory case of Luxembourg, 
which amended the constitution for the sole reason of giving parties constitutional status. The 
analysis suggests that the constitutional regulation of political parties depends on their current 
interests and power status. Additionally, the paper draws attention to the involvement of external 
actors and nevertheless to the changing nature of contemporary constitutionalism. 
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Introduction  
 
Scholars have recently begun to closely examine party regulations in democracies both old and 
new (see Barnedt, 1998; Janda, 2005; Müller and Sieberer, 2006; Reilly, 2006; Bogaards et al, 
2010; van Biezen 2012; Rashkova and van Biezen 2014). In addition to ordinary laws, countries 
have increasingly sought to regulate political parties by noting them in their constitutions. This 
article enquires into why constitutions have become a prime agency for regulating political 
parties.  It concentrates on the demand for constitutional regulation of parties by examining the 
relevant actors involved in the process. Based on insights from the literature on political parties, 
constitutionalism and on theories of regulation, it explains why parties are included as a 
constitutional feature in contemporary democracies and what the implications are for political 
systems. 
 
After the Second World War (WWII), political parties have progressively been regulated by the 
constitutions of European democracies and recognised in constitutional terms as necessary 
institutional components of the democratic system. Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany 
were among the first countries to note political parties in their new constitutions of 1947 and 
UHVSHFWLYHO\7KHVHFRXQWULHV¶LQLWLDWLYHRISDUW\FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQKDVEHHQIROORZHGLQ
waves by the large majority of European democracies. In the majority of postmodern European 
countries, parties were included in the new constitutions adopted in the post-war, post-
independence or post-authoritarian regime period. After the first post-war constitutionalisation of 
parties, several constitutions were amended to strengthen or expand the role of political parties 
(Biezen and Borz 2012).  
 
Previous scholarship has focused on how the constitutional regulation of parties is worded (van 
Biezen, 2012) and analysed the content of European constitutional regulations or discussed the 
reasons behind the lack of party constitutionalisation in common law countries (Gauja, 2010). 
This article complements previous research by discussing the question of why countries adopt 
party constitutional regulation. Little is known regarding the demand for party 
constitutionalisation, the actors involved in the process and their justifications. These aspects are 
addressed by this article through an analytical framework of party constitutional regulation in a 
democratic system.  
 
  
This article discusses the case of Luxembourg, which provides valuable insights into the process 
RISDUW\FRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJXODWLRQ/X[HPERXUJLVDµSDUW\DPHQGPHQWRQO\¶FDVHWKDWRIIHUVD
better opportunity for analysis (cf. Yin, 2003) in comparison with cases in which the 
constitutional articles on parties were amended in larger processes of constitutional reform. Until 
2008, in addition to the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, Luxembourg was one of the 
few countries in Europe that did not mention political parties in their written constitutions. The 
counWU\¶VEDVLFODZZDVUHYLVHGLQVROHO\WRLQWURGXFHDVSHFLDODUWLFOHRQSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV
Political parties in Luxembourg were already subject to regulation via the 1999 ordinary law on 
the reimbursement of campaign expenses. Furthermore, a constitutional amendment is a time-
consuming and costly procedure that usually requires a qualified majority and the agreement of 
the actors involved (Rasch and Congleton, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002). Thus, the Luxembourg case is 
revelatory because it provides an opportunity to analyse those justifications, which solely explain 
the salience of constitutionalising parties, while it controls for all other intervening influences.  
 
The article proceeds as follows: first, it presents a framework for analysing the constitutional 
regulation of parties, which bridges theoretical arguments from scholarship on political parties, 
new constitutionalism and economic regulation. Second, this article illustrates the framework by 
using the case of Luxembourg and presenting the forces behind the 2008 constitutional revision 
and their justifications. This article then concludes by assessing the implications of a 
contemporary constitutional revision on the importance attributed to political parties in 
contemporary democracies.  
 
General framework for party constitutional regulation 
 
Party constitutional regulation, whether detailed or symbolic in its content, first and foremost 
represents the recognition of parties as necessary institutions in the political system. Party 
constitutional regulation is different from legal party regulation for various reasons. The 
constitution sets the principles to be followed by ordinary laws, it provides rigidity and stability to 
SDUWLHV¶DFTXLUHGOHJDOVWDWXVLWDYRLGVDG-hoc secondary legislation designed to favour partisan 
LQWHUHVWV*DXMDDQGUHFHQWO\LWDGDSWVDQGUHIOHFWVFRQWHPSRUDU\FKDQJHVLQSDUWLHV¶
status from being mainly outside the reach of the state to being in need of state resources (Biezen 
and Kopecky, 2014). 
 
  
The framework advanced in this article illustrates the justifications behind different models of 
party constitutional regulation (see table 1). It considers the actors involved in the constitutional 
revision process (parties, national institutions, and external actors) and presents their 
justifications.  It further advances propositions on the relation between justifications and the 
expected content of constitutional regulation. This framework complements previous scholarship 
by Renwick (2010) and Nwokora (2014), which discusses competitive, cooperative and 
ideological strategies in adopting electoral and party finance laws. In contrast to the latter, party 
constitutional regulation involves a constitutional revision procedure that operates by different 
rules. There are more incentives for cooperation and cartel behaviour given the need for a 
qualified majority to pass amendments and more contemporary involvement of international 
actors.  
 
Although the content of party constitutionalisation has been previously examined from a 
comparative perspective (see van Biezen and Borz 2012), the framework presented here 
emphasises the justifications for constitutional regulation. As detailed below, these have been 
derived following a combination of a deductive approach with cues from new constitutionalism 
(j1, j5, j6), economic regulation and party theory (j2, j3, j4), with an inductive approach through 
process tracing. The latter clarified the key actors and steps in the contemporary constitutional 
revision process. 
 
In addressing the question of why parties are included in the constitutions of democratic states, 
one needs to acknowledge how ideas regarding constitutions and constitutionalism have changed 
over time. The old liberal and republican doctrines of constitutionalism assigned three functions 
to a modern constitution: creation of a political entity, establishment of its fundamental 
institutional structure, and limitations on the exercise of political power (Murphy, 1993; 
Castiglione, 1996). With time, as individual rights became more important, constitutions became 
structures of political legitimation (Sartori, 1994; Bartolini, 2010). This approach emphasises that 
QHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPVKRXOGPRYHEH\RQGµWKHWUDGLWLRQDOFRQFHUQRIOLPLWLQJWKHH[HUFLVHRI
SROLWLFDOSRZHU¶(ONin, 1993: 21). Its analytical relevance for party constitutionalisation is based 
on highlighting (1) the membership of citizens in political parties, (2) parties as necessary 
institutions that contribute to the balance of interests within society and (3) the role of judicial 
review through constitutional courts.  
 
  
First, contemporary constitutionalism focuses on citizenship as a form of responsible membership 
in institutions, such as states, corporations, unions or political parties, in which membership is 
regarded as a voluntary association of principals (Elkin, 1993). Subsequently, the practice in 
contemporary democracies is to delegate the task of representation to political parties. 
Constitutions now recognise parties as the agents of citizens, who are the ultimate principals in a 
democracy. Second, the competition between political parties in elections and in parliament offers 
a balance of power that creates government accountability to the electorate (Bellamy, 2007). 
Consequently, representative democracies recognise political parties in their constitutions as 
institutions that contribute to the balance of interests within society. Third, new constitutionalism 
emphasises the role of judicial review and of constitutional courts in assessing the constitutional 
legality of other legal norms and in ensuring that political elites are acting upon democratic 
principles (Stone Sweet 2000). Therefore, Constitutional Courts can exercise checks on the 
activity and behaviour of political parties.  
 
What one must consider when discussing contemporary constitutionalism is the influence of 
external actors on national constitutional practices. When international actors become involved in 
national politics, constitutional independence is ceded and sovereign equality is transformed. By 
the end of the 20th century, constitutionalism had already moved beyond the state. The European 
Union has the need to address recognition of its structures in a constitutional framework (Wiener, 
2007). Constitutions consider the policy-making needs of contemporary policies (Elkin, 1993) 
and recognise that in contemporary democracies, the task of representation is delegated to 
political parties. From this follows the need to introduce parties in the constitution or have a 
stipulation regarding further secondary legislation on party finance or party organisation. 
 
Similar to constitutions and constitutionalism, political parties have undergone various stages of 
development from cadre and mass parties to catch-all and, later, cartel parties that are more and 
PRUHILQDQFLDOO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKHVWDWH.DW]DQG0DLU7KHVHSDUWLHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
regulation has become progressively more extensive. In terms of content, the models of party 
constitutional regulation have developed differently in the period since WWII (see van Biezen 
2012). Immediately after the war and from the 1970s until late 1989, the emphasis was on parties 
in public office (government, parliament and their role in elections). After the 1990s, the 
emphasis changed towards a party constitutional regulation model aimed at defending democracy. 
It is under this model that the extra-parliamentary party (i.e., conditions and limitations to 
membership in political parties) is defined by constitutions together with rights and freedoms 
  
expressed by parties (i.e., freedom of association). However, the constitutional regulation of 
parties as a special type of public utility in relation to democratic principles has received minimal 
focus after the war but increased in importance in the 1970s (Portugal) and more recently after 
2000 (Switzerland and Luxembourg). 
 
Political actors and their justifications 
To explain why countries adopt party constitutional regulation, this paper analyses the demand for 
constitutional regulation. This demand may originate from different societal and political actors 
with different justifications. The actors are expected to be political parties, national institutions or 
other organisations such as the media or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local 
constituents or international organisations. 
 
To understand the need for regulation of political parties by constitutions, one can draw on the 
HFRQRPLFWKHRU\RIUHJXODWLRQZKLFKDUJXHVWKDWµDVDUXOHUHJXODWLRQLVDFTXLUHGE\WKHLQGXVWU\
and is designed and RSHUDWHGSULPDULO\IRULWVEHQHILWV¶6WLJOHU6LPLODUO\E\DSSO\LQJ
this logic, it is to be expected that party constitutional regulation will be acquired and designed 
primarily for the benefit of parties, particularly the incumbents who are the primary actors 
involved. It is parties that control the process of constitutional revision, and no amendment would 
SDVVZLWKRXWWKHLUDJUHHPHQW3DUWLHV¶LQWHUHVWVDUHUHODWHGWRSRZHUH[SUHVVHGDVRIILFHSROLF\RU
votes (Strøm 1990); however, before such goals are realised, they are also interested in 
organisDWLRQDOVXUYLYDO+HQFHWKHSDUWLHV¶MXVWLILFDWLRQVVWULYHWRPHHWWKRVHLQWHUHVWV)URPWKH
perspective of parties and of other actors involved, one can identify at least six justifications and 
benefits of constitutional regulation. 
 
FirstWKHOHJLWLPDWLRQRISDUWLHV¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOagency role (j1) and hence the recognition 
of their importance as agents of citizens in a democracy. 3DUWLHV¶OHJLWLPDWLRQDV
agents provides the acknowledgement of being part of the power structure and 
SURYLGHVOHJDOVWDWXVWRWKHOLQNZLWKYRWHUVDQGZLWKGHSXWLHVHOHFWHGRQSDUWLHV¶
HOHFWRUDOOLVW'LUHFWUHFRJQLWLRQLQDFRQVWLWXWLRQDODUWLFOHOHJDOO\YDOLGDWHVSDUWLHV¶
roles and activities; it further institutionalises the delegation chain from voters to 
SDUW\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVLQWKHSDUOLDPHQW'LUHFWUHFRJQLWLRQPDNHVSDUWLHV¶SODFHLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPHQWUHQFKHGE\WKHFRXQWU\¶VKLJKHUODZZKLFKLVXOWLPDWHO\
more stable and less prone to change in comparison with an ordinary law. 
 
  
Second, to ensure organisational survival (j2) and functional local branches throughout 
the electoral cycle, parties need resources and direct subsidies from the state; this 
can compensate for declining resources from membership fees. As actors directly 
involved in the constitutionalisation process, parties can grant themselves 
advantages. Parties can share an interest in receiving resources from the state. State 
subsidies will, at least in part, contribute to reducing or preventing financial 
scandals and corrupt clientelistic practices related to private donations.  
 
The third justification (j3) LVWKHµHOLPLQDWLRQ¶DQGFOHDUrole distinction from possible 
µULYDOV¶VXFKDVRWKHUSROLWLFDOJURXSVRUDVVRFLDWLRQV3ROLWLFDOSDUWLHVZDQWWR
protect their role of proffering candidates for election and sending elected 
representatives to the parliament. In particular, leftist parties, which traditionally 
had links with trade unions, are expected to emphasise this justification.  
 
The fourth justification (j4) is the gain of control over the entry of other parties into the 
system to restrict competition, particularly from possible anti-system, 
undemocratic parties. Various constitutions may ban certain parties such as the 
fascist party in Italy or Poland, parties that may be a threat to democracy in those 
states, particularly in countries with an authoritarian past.  
 
Political parties are involved in this regulatory process either individually as an 
organisation or collectively via state institutions. Demand for constitutional regulation of 
parties can originate from other non-state actors. From this perspective, one can add other 
justifications for the constitutional regulation of democratic parties.  
 
[Table 1. about here] 
The fifth justification (j5) is related to the place that political parties have acquired in a 
political system and the need to prevent any misuse of power via special oversight 
and restrictions. The objective is to protect the democratic system against corrupt 
activities and to ensure that the behaviour and activities of parties run in 
accordance with the higher law of the country. Consequently, parties will become 
more accountable; their activity will be more transparent and more public. 
Although mainly addressed by state institutions, opposition parties are also 
expected to resort to this justification.  
  
 
The sixth justification (j6) for party constitutional regulation is legal administrative 
necessity or efficiency gains for all actors involved in the process. Constitutional 
regulation offers the basis for compliance with secondary legislation on parties and 
the need for its rigorous application. Additionally, when confronted with various 
cases that involve political parties, courts will find it easier to make normative and 
empirical judgements regarding political dynamics and entities, which they can 
identify and for which they will find legitimacy in the constitution. 
 
The type of justification depends on the political actors involved in the process of constitutional 
regulation (see table 1). The initiative can originate from any actor; however, the entire process of 
constitutional regulation can involve all of them. Scandals (corruption, fiscal evasion) may 
prompt reform, and politicians may not discuss them extensively; in this case, it is the media, 
NGOs or external actors that may play a SURDFWLYHUROHDQGSXVKWKHUHIRUPIRUZDUG7KHDFWRUV¶
positions will follow national and international legal practices.             
 
Established political parties with or without parliamentary representation can resort to these 
justifications as single actors (table 1). Partisan institutions such as the parliament and the 
government are also expected to justify the constitutional legitimation of parties on similar lines 
as parties themselves, given the entrenchment of parties in the state institutions, but on a 
FROOHFWLYHEDVLV7KHVHLQVWLWXWLRQV¶RIILFLDOSRVLWLRQLVSUHGLFWHGWRUHIOHFWWKHSRVLWLRQRISDUWLHVLQ
government more. Other advisory national bodies involved are envisaged to present justifications 
related to democracy and the appropriate functioning of a political system, such as legitimation, 
prevention of misuse of power and legal administrative efficiency. The external non-state actors 
(international organisations, press, and public pressure) involved in the process are more likely to 
advance the last two justifications because their function is to monitor national democratic 
standards.  
 
Justifications and constitutionalisation outcomes  
 
The type(s) of justification brought forward by actors can impact the preferred degree and type of 
constitutional regulation. The institutional role for democracy can be legitimised via less 
regulation, whereas preventing misuse of power and administrative efficiency both imply further 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWLSXODWLRQVDQGUHVWULFWLRQVRQSDUWLHV¶RUJDQLsation and activities. In terms of 
  
content, three models of party constitutionalisation have been identified in previous comparative 
studies of post-ZDU(XURSHDQFRQVWLWXWLRQVµSXEOLFXWLOLWLHV¶µSDUWLHVLQSXEOLFRIILFH¶DQG
µGHIHQGLQJGHPRFUDF\¶VHHYDn Biezen and Borz 2012). Each model of party constitutionalisation 
can be linked to more than one justification (see table 1).  
 
How each justification is related to the three models of party constitutionalisation is detailed 
below and expressed in Propositions 1-3. Proposition 4 explains the evolution of a constitutional 
amendment from the proposal to the adoption stage. As countries adopt party constitutional 
regulation tailored mainly around one dominant model (van Biezen 2012), one case can verify 
one proposition (P1-P3) at a specific point in time. At the most, one case (country) can offer a 
valid test of propositions across time. 
  
Justifications become dominant when a majority of actors agree on a particular proposal by 
providing similar motivations to back their position. These motivations are expected to invoke 
binding constitutional principles (democracy, representation, and rule of law), which are the 
foundations for each constitutionalisation model and which will subsequently be reflected in the  
SURSRVHGWH[W'RPLQDQWMXVWLILFDWLRQVZLOOUHYHDOSDUWLHV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGSRZHUVWDWXVRUEHWKH
result of particular events such as political scandals or external influence. Contagion from other 
countries, following certain political events, may play a role in influencing the reform text. 
 
Justifications along the line of democratic institutional legitimation and organisational survival in 
both old and new democracies are H[SHFWHGWRDFFRPSDQ\WKHHOLWH¶VFKRLFHIor a proposal that 
emphasisHVSDUWLHV¶UROHVDVSXEOLFXWLOLWLHV7KLVPRGHORIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJXODWLRQLQYROYHVWKH
constitutional definition of key democratic principles such as pluralism, popular will, sovereignty, 
equality, participation and competition, in terms of political parties. This model also means 
providing parties with access to public resources in the form of state funding or free broadcasting 
time on national media. Proposition 1. When justification j1 or j2 is dominant, the 
constitutionalLVDWLRQPRGHOµSDUWLHVDVSXEOLFXWLOLWLHV¶ZLOOEHSURSRVHG 
 
Another choice can be an instrumental constitutional regulation focused on parties in public 
office. This perspective provides parties with a functional necessity for elections, parliaments and 
governments and can be found in older established democracies. The public face of parties 
reflects their electoral role, their activity as parliamentary groups and their governmental capacity. 
Hence, the justification provided by actors for constitutional regulation is expected to emphasise 
  
the distinctive representative activity of parties in such institutions in comparison with other 
groups that can also aggregate and represent interests but without sending their representatives to 
parliament. Proposition 2. When justification j3 is dominant, the constitutionalisation model 
µSDUWLHVLQSXEOLFRIILFH¶ZLOOEHSURSRVHG 
 
Justifications related to the prevention of misuse of power via special oversight and restrictions 
are expected to be linked to the third model of party constitutional regulation - defending 
democracy. This outcome identifies parties with fundamental democratic rights and tends to 
constrain their identity, activity and behaviour to be in accordance with the fundamental values of 
the democratic constitutional order. Democracy can be protected by regulating the activity and 
behaviour of parties, their identity and programme, by establishing restrictions to party 
membership and by maintaining them under judicial oversight. The model is followed mainly by 
new democracies, and the justifications advanced are expected to be along the lines that preclude 
any undemocratic elite behaviour. Proposition 3.  When justification j4, j5 or j6 is dominant, the 
constitutionaliVDWLRQPRGHOµGHIHQGLQJGHPRFUDF\¶ will be proposed. 
 
Usually, constitutional amendment rates decrease as the number of veto players increases, 
particularly when voters are involved in the process through ratification referendums (Lutz 1994; 
Rasch and Congleton 2006). Between the proposal and the adoption stage of a constitutional 
amendment there is an intermediate phase, which involves parliamentary negotiations and vote 
decisions. Because constitutional amendments are usually adopted with a qualified majority, the 
adopted proposal will very much depend on the existence of a parliamentary (required) majority, 
on the number of institutional and partisan veto players and on the level of agreement among 
political parties. When the number of institutions with veto powers involved in the process of 
constitutional change increases, the final amendment proposal is likely to encounter several 
PRGLILFDWLRQVIURPLWVLQLWLDOWH[W7KHLQFXPEHQWV¶SURSRVDOVDUHXVXDOO\H[SHFWHGWRSUHYDLO
provided that certain conditions are met. Their proposed amendments may involve modifications 
depending on whether they need additional votes for the required majority in parliament. The 
content of initial amendments will be subsequently altered to secure sufficient approval. 
Proposition 4. The adopted constitutional aPHQGPHQWVDUHOLNHO\WRUHIOHFWWKHLQFXPEHQW¶V
preferences, particularly when the number of institutional veto players is low.  
 
To illustrate the framework and examine the justifications for constitutional regulation of political 
parties (whether related to agency legitimation, organisational survival, democratic competition, 
  
role distinction from rivals, misuse of power or administrative legal necessity) and their link to 
the outcomes or models of constitutionalisation, the analysis and discussion in the next sections 
illustrates the process using the Luxembourg case.  
 
Case study: background and empirical strategy 
 
After several proposals registered from 2001 until 2007, without attracting much media attention, 
the final text of article 32bis1 marking the constitutionalisation of political parties in Luxembourg 
entered into force in March 2008 and reads as follows: µ3DUWLHVRUSROLWLFDOJURXSVH[SUHVV
democratic pluralism. They contribute to the formation of popular will and the expression of 
universal suffrage. They form and freely exercise their activity under the respect of the 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKHODZ¶. The full text of all proposals is presented in the Online Appendix, table 
2.   
 
7KHFRXQWU\¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHYLVLRQSURFHGXUHUHTXLUHVDPHndments to be adopted by the 
Chamber of Deputies during the same term, in two successive votes, separated by an interval of at 
least three months (Schmit, 2009), each with at least two-thirds of its members of Parliament 
(MPs). Another national actor involved is the advisory Council of State, which is perceived as a 
substitute for a second chamber and has 21 politically affiliated members appointed for 15 years. 
The Council can suggest adaptations and modifications to bills and proposals (Dumont and De 
Winter, 2003), and if it chooses not to exempt the Chamber from the second vote, it can delay the 
adoption of bills by at least three months (Dumont and Poirier, 2007). Every five years, 60 MPs 
are elected to the Chamber by a system of proportional representation with open lists. In a system 
with six parliamentary parties since 1999, the dominant parties are the Socialist Party (LSAP) and 
WKH&KULVWLDQ6RFLDO3HRSOH¶V3DUW\&697KHVHSDUWLHVJRYHUQHGWRJHWKHUDWWKHWLPHRIWKH
amendment, and outside that period, they seldom formed different governing coalitions with 
either the Democratic Party (DP) or the GRÉNG (Greens). 
 
The most relevant international actors for the constitutional regulation of parties were the Council 
of Europe via the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the Venice Commission, an 
advisory body to the European Council that provides legal advice to countries on laws that are 
important to the democratic functioning of institutions. 
 
  
In terms of methodology, this study is based on the content analysis of documents that are 
advanced in the process of constitutional revision from the proposal to the adoption stage. These 
documents were scrutinised for reasons each actor provided in favour or against various 
proposals. The inherent limitation of analysing formal documents and recorded debates is the 
inability to unveil interests that are unlikely to be publicly admitted. Interviews with the political 
elite (the LSAP party leader, the chair of the institutional reforms committee, the president of the 
Council of State, and one member of the Parliamentary Constitutional Commission) were used to 
LGHQWLI\WKHVWDJHVLQWKHSURFHVVDQGDVDYDOLGLW\FKHFNRQDFWRUV¶MXVWLILFDWLRQVThe documents 
for analysis were selected based on a process tracing strategy that followed the legal steps in the 
constitutional revision procedure (see Online Appendix for details). Each party, parliamentary 
commission and institution involved in the process was required to present an official position 
paper on the constitutional amendment. The content of amendments was analysed by codifying 
the legal text in accordance with established methods (see van Biezen and Borz 2012), whereas 
WKHMXVWLILFDWLRQVRIWKLVIUDPHZRUNZHUHLGHQWLILHGLQWKHDFWRUV¶PRWLYDWLRQVIURPposition 
papers, reports, debates or interviews. Detailed examples of justifications are presented in the 
Online Appendix, Table 1.  
 
Why include parties in the constitution of Luxembourg: justifications and outcomes 
 
The 2001 amendment proposal  
The 2001 proposal was advanced by socialist opposition MP Asselborn and verifies Proposition 
1. The proposal was similar to article 32bis adopted in 2007 but with an additional sentence on 
the need for parties to respect the constitution and hence the need for their further regulation and 
judicial oversight.  The constitutionalisation model, which transpired from the 2001 text (table 2 
Online Appendix), is parties as public utilities because parties were associated mainly with 
democratic principles such as pluralism, popular will, and universal suffrage.  
 
The dominant justification behind the need for a constitutional regulation was agency legitimation 
(j1). During the Constitutional Commission meeting (Chambre des Députés, 2001: 6),  
politicians across all parliamentary groups emphasised the necessity of regulating parties and the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIVWLSXODWLQJLQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQWKDWWKH\DUHµHVVHQWLDOLQVWUXPHQWV¶LQDGHPRFUDF\
The individual positions of party groups occurred later in 2002, when the Greens emphasised the 
need to recognisHSDUWLHVDVWKHµH[SUHVVLRQRIDGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVVRISROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ¶
&KDPEUHGHV'pSXWpVD6LPLODUO\WKHSDUWLHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJXODWLRQZDVVXSSRUWHG
  
by the ADR (Action Committee for Democracy and Social Justice) because, as organisational 
VWUXFWXUHVSDUWLHVKDYHEHFRPHµLPSHUDWLYHIRUH[SUHVVLQJWKHSRSXODUZLOODQGIRUJDLQLQJWKH
SRSXODUYRWH¶&KDPEUHGHV'pSXWpVF 
 
To simplify the article while taking inspiration from the French constitution,  article 42, the 
Commission of Institutions and Constitutional Revision, made changes to the 2001 text and 
UHSODFHGµUHVSHFWIRUFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKHODZ¶ZLWKµUHVSHFWIRUGHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOHV¶&KDPEUH
des Députés, 2001). With the exception of one incumbent party, CSV (Chambre des Députés, 
2003a), no party group completely agreed with the main text of the amendment; therefore, no text 
was proffered for discussion in the Chamber and no other institutional actor became involved in 
the process. 
 
To distinguish themselves from other SROLWLFDOµULYDOV¶M, in 2002, the Socialist opposition 
group (LSAP), in their written position, recommended avoiding the placement of political parties 
and political groups at the same level of legal importance and suggested the constitutional text be 
limited to political parties only (Chambre des Députés, 2002b). Similarly, the other much smaller 
opposition party, ADR, demanded more clarity to avoid interpretations according to which 
political groups can develop into political parties and vice versa (Chambre des Députés 2002c). 
The Greens, also in opposition until 2013,  requested the specification of a secondary law on 
political parties to be noted in the constitutional text and emphasised that due to party finance 
VFDQGDOVIURPWKHVDQGVWKHFRQWURORISDUWLHV¶VWDWXVDQGDFWLYLW\KDVEHFRPHD legal 
necessity (j6) (Chambre de Députés, 2002a,c). Subsequently, the other incumbent, the Democratic 
Party (DP), acknowledged the 2001 proposal as raising the problem of clarifying the legal status 
of political parties and political groups (Chambre des Députés, 2003b).  
 
The 2002 amendment proposal  
Demanding more regulation, the small opposition parliamentary group of ADR did not provide its 
accord to the 2001 proposal; instead, it proposed another text, which would also include respect 
IRUµWKHSULQFLSOHRIQDWLRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\¶,IDGRSWHGLQWKHIRUPDWVHHWDEOH Online 
Appendix), the dominant model of party constitutionalisation would have been the defending 
GHPRFUDF\PRGHOZKLFKVHWVUHVWULFWLRQVRQSDUWLHV¶DFWLYLW\DQGEHKDYLRXUDQGDVVLJQVWKHPWR
the judicial oversight procedure. This proposal had, as prevalent justification, preventing the 
misuse of power (j5) and verifies Proposition 3.  According to ADR, parties and democracies 
FXUUHQWO\µKDYHEHFRPHLQVHSDUDEOH¶DQGDUHKHQFHµREOLJHGWRGHYHORSDVRFLDOJOREDOYLVLRQ
  
ZKLFKHTXDOO\LQWHJUDWHVGLYHUVHLQWHUHVWV¶&KDPEUHGHV'pSXWpVF7KH$'5HTXDOO\
stressed that both parties and political groups should be guaranteed similar rights by the 
constitution. Given that this proposal resembled the 2001 proposal, which raised wide criticism, it 
has not received further consideration from the Commission.  
 
The 2004 proposals 
An extensive proposal for constitutional revision was proffered in 2004 by the incumbent MP 
(DP) Rippinger (table 2 Online Appendix). The text is composed of a long article 26bis (which 
included separate provisions on the status, organisation, activity and finance of parties) and a 
revised article 95 in which the Constitutional Court gains the power of checking the conformity of 
DSROLWLFDOSDUW\ZLWKWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ7KHH[SRVLWLRQRIPRWLYHVE\WKH'3VWLSXODWHVWKDWµ,Q
fact, Luxembourg is not protected from extremist parties that could threaten democracy and 
IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV¶&KDPEUHGHV'pSXWpV, 2004b: 3). This proposal follows the defending 
democracy model of constitutional regulation and verifies Proposition 3.  
 
Restricting competition from anti-system parties (j4) has emerged as one of the main justifications 
behind the 2004 proposal. During the February 2004 session of the Constitutional Commission, 
the debates essentially stressed the need to avoid any possible competition from or legitimation of 
extremist parties. The Greens also emphasised that a clear and detailed regulation will avoid any 
abuse of power (j5). With the exception of the Greens, all parties rejected the idea of excessively 
controlling the activity of parties during the 2004 parliamentary debates (Chambre des Députés, 
2004a). The argument was related to the 1937 historical events, when a law on disbanding the 
Communist Party or of any other violent groups or associations was subjected to a referendum 
and failed to gain popular support. The Socialist Party wanted to avoid the repeat of such an event 
LQZKLFKFLWL]HQVRSSRVHGWKHLQLWLDWLYHRISROLWLFDOSDUWLHV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHSDUW\¶V03
Asselborn proffered in 2004 his previous 2001 proposal, which as discussed, verifies Proposition 
1.  This time, the proposal was shorter in length (table 2 Online Appendix) and more in line with 
the coalition partner, CSV preference for a concise constitutionalisation. To facilitate agreement 
on a final text, the Commission instituted a working group across all parties, and the issue 
UHWXUQHGRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDJHQGDLQ 
 
The 2007 proposal  
The 2007 amendment proposal by incumbent LSAP Asselborn can be assigned to a 
constitutionalisation model that portrays parties as public utilities, and the justifications outlined 
  
below provide support for Proposition 1. Political parties and each national institution involved in 
the constitutional revision process expressed a position with regard to this proposal. With the 
Government, the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of State, as detailed below, each 
emphasised the need for democratic institutional legitimation (j1) as the prevalent justification in 
their official position papers. Specifically, these actors referred to the need for a legal 
acknowOHGJPHQWRISDUWLHV¶VWDWXVLQDGHPRFUDF\WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLUHQWUHQFKPHQWLQVWDWH
institutions and the legal institutional link to their MPs. 
 
The need for democratic institutional legitimation following the development of parties was 
openly acknowledged by the incumbent CSV politicians during the 2007 parliamentary debates: 
µ7RGD\>«@ZHKDYHDGLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKWRSDUWLHVEHFDXVHWRGD\ZHDOVRUHFRJQL]HWKH
important activities of parties, because we are also prepared to strengthen the parties, >«@DQG
DOVRWRUHFRJQL]HLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQWKHUROHWKH\IXOILOLQUHDOLW\¶&KDPEUHGHV'pSXWpVG
3). 7KHOHJLWLPDWLRQRISDUWLHV¶UROHLQDGHPRFUDF\LVREWDLQHGYLDWKHLURIILFLDOUHFRJQLWLRQ7KH
positions advanced during debates legitimated parties by emphasising various steps in the chain of 
delegation. Parties are the link between voters and the politicians who are elected; this is also 
emphasisHGE\WKHRSSRVLWLRQ*UHHQ03Vµ,ISDUWLHVGLGQRWH[LVWDQGWKHUHZHUHRQO\FDQGLGDWH
lists, this would end up in limiting the link between the voters and the people they voted for [...]. 
But that is not the case because there are political structures [parties] in which all citizens can be 
LQYROYHG¶&KDPEUHGHV'pSXWpVG&LWL]HQVUHO\RQ political parties to articulate and 
aggregate their interests, and parties are the intermediaries in the chain of delegation. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\DFFRUGLQJWRFRQVWLWXWLRQDOH[SHUWVDUWLFOHELVVLJQLILHVWKHµLQVWLWXWLRQDO
OHJLWLPDWLRQ¶RISROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDQGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDIRUPDOOLQNDJHZLWKµWKHLU¶GHSXWLHV
(Schmit, 2009: 176). Additionally, the Council of State emphasisHGSDUWLHV¶SDUWLFXODUWDVNRI
selecting and presenting candidates for elections, which allows for the expression of universal 
suffrage and ultimately the exercise of a mandate in public institutions (Chambre des Députés 
2007b). Although the mandate and parliamentary activity of MPs were previously regulated 
separately by the constitution, they were formally related as of 2008. 
 
During the 2007 parliamentary debates, most party groups appealed for an official 
acknowledgement of their role and activities, which contribute to the stability and continuity of 
democratic institutions. Incumbent MPs from CSV agree with the LSAP deputies who declare 
WKDWSOXUDOLVPDQGSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶DFWLYLWLHVDUHHVVHQWLDOHOHPHQWVRIGHPRFUDF\µ:LWKRXWWKHP
  
a parliamentary democracy cannot function in the long run, but it is also equally clear that a 
democracy does not function entirely through SROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶Chambre des Députés 2007d: 1).  
 
The government, in its official position, recognised parties as being essential elements for the 
DSSURSULDWHIXQFWLRQLQJRI/X[HPERXUJ¶VGHPRFUDWLFSDUOLDPHQWDU\UHJLPHDQGIDYRXUHGWKH
revision (Chambre des Députés, 2007a). Although the Council of State did not initially view the 
necessity of including parties in the constitution (before 2008, their status was associations as per 
art. 26 of the constitution), it did ultimately stress the essential democratic role of political parties 
as justification for constitutional status. As stipulated by the Council (Chambre des Députés, 
2007b), the agents were already performing functions recognised as essential for democracy, and 
they needed to be credited for their activity.  
 
Secondary justifications that transpired that year referred to prevention of abuse of power (j5) and 
administrative necessity (j6). The Council of State official reaction made reference to checks on 
monopoly and misuse of power (j5) by political parties. Notwithstanding that in 2007, the Council 
recommended a short version of the article without much legal restraint on parties, they further 
DGYLVHGFDXWLRQRQWKHXVDJHRIWHUPVVXFKDVµH[SUHVV¶YVµFRQWULEXWHWRWKHH[SUHVVLRQ¶VRWKDW
political parties could not be understood as the sole agents that express democratic pluralism 
(Chambre des Députés 2007b). Trade unions and associations can perform a similar function. 
However, the suggestions of the Council of State were not considered necessary to be 
implemented by the Parliamentary Commission.  
 
)URPWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVLWZDVQRVXUSULVHWKDW*5(&2¶VUHDFWLRQVLQLWVFRXQWU\
evaluation report emphasised the issue of transparency in political financing and that of conflicts 
of interest involving elected representatives (j5). GRECO expresses positions on any type of 
abuse of power that can undermine fundamental civil and political rights, such as the right of 
expression, association and the right to free elections, all of which are partly implemented through 
the activity of political parties. The Venice Commission did welcome the placement of political 
parties at a constitutional level and raised the question of whether the provision could be 
interpreted as a monopoly of political parties (Venice Commission, 2009).  
 
The international actors also stressed the administrative necessity (j6) of party constitutional 
regulation. This justification implies a clear definition of parties as legal entities with transparent 
activities. As a full member of GRECO, Luxembourg participates without restrictions in mutual 
  
HYDOXDWLRQSURFHGXUHV$VWKHLQWHUYLHZVFRQGXFWHGVXJJHVWLQDQLQGLUHFWPDQQHU*5(&2¶V
recommendations have prompted the constitutional revision. The Council of State reaction for 
immediate action in defining the status of political parties in the constitution before the adoption 
RIDILQDQFHODZZDVLQSDUWLQIOXHQFHGE\*5(&2¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV3. Since 2001, in its 
evaluation reports on the transparency of political funding in Luxembourg, the group also 
DGGUHVVHGWKHODFNRIOHJDOGHILQLWLRQVRISROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDQGODWHUZHOFRPHGWKH&KDPEHU¶V
decision to consider a constitutional revision that was meant to incorporate political parties 
*5(&27KHJURXS¶VOHJDOLQSXW was seconded by the Venice Commission. The 
Commission noticed the absence of a clear definition of political parties and noted its necessity: 
µ2ZLQJWRWKHLPSRUWDQFHJLYHQWRSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLWZRXOGEHXVHIXOWR
define them in thiVPHPRUDQGXPZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRDQ\UHOHYDQWODZVLIQRWLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶
(Venice Commission, 2009: 5).  
 
Explaining the adoption and wording of the 2007 proposal  
 
Following the favourable position taken by all national actors, the 2007 proposal was discussed 
and voted in the Chamber in December of the same year (Chambre des Députés 2007c). 
3URSRVLWLRQVWLSXODWHVWKDWWKHDGRSWHGDPHQGPHQWLQLWVILQDOWH[WZLOOIDYRXUWKHLQFXPEHQWV¶
position if the number of institutional veto players is low. The number of institutional veto players 
increases with each institutional authority beyond parliament, institutions that must agree to the 
proposed amendment. Luxembourg had none of the veto players who could be included in this 
category such as bicameralism, presidentialism, federalism or mandatory referendum 
requirements for validation. Thought to act as a secondary chamber, the Council of State only has 
advisory powers and cannot be regarded as a full-fledged veto player with a strong influence in 
the adoption of an amendment; certain recommendations from the Council were not considered.  
 
The reduced number of institutional veto players and the parliamentary strength made it very easy 
for incumbent parties in 2007 to achieve consensus for their favoured proposal. Between 2004 
and 2009, the government was formed by the LSAP and CSV, who were short of two MPs to 
achieve the qualified majority needed to pass the constitutional amendment. As shown in table 2 
Online Appendix, the successful proposal, which the Parliament adopted, originated from the 
governing party. Opposition parties were consistently in favour of more extensive regulation but, 
once in government (LSAP), also ready to accommodate the preferences of their coalition partner 
  
(CSV) to achieve the required qualified majority in the Chamber (see LSAP proposals from 2001 
until 2007, table 2 Online Appendix).  
 
(DUO\SURSRVDOVE\RSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHVWULJJHUHGFULWLFLVPIURPWKHFRDOLWLRQV¶SDUWLVDQYHWR
players. The 2001 proposal by LSAP, then an opposition party, did not achieve consensus because 
parties assigned high importance to their freedom of activity. A certain control by the 
Constitutional Court would have been against the current political practices in Luxembourg 
(Chambre des Députés 2007d). The Greens and CSV protested against constitutional control on 
the status and activities of political parties on the grounds that the Court exercises control solely 
over laws and treaties. Moreover, given the absence of an authoritarian past, there was no need for 
a stronger constitutional court.  Similarly, the 2002 and 2004 proposals by opposition parties 
ADR and DP encountered resistance from the incumbents partly for stipulating excessive 
restrictions and were not provided to the plenary session by the parliamentary Commission. 
Consequently, to achieve consensus, the subsequent 2007 proposal by incumbent Asselborn 
(LSAP) was shorter in length (Chambre des Députés, 2004b) and very much in accordance with 
the final text adopted (see table 2 Online Appendix). 
 
Another explanatory factor for why previous proposals were not endorsed, is the constitutional 
UHYLVLRQSURFHGXUHZKLFKXQWLO'HFHPEHULQYROYHGWKHDXWRPDWLFµGLVVROXWLRQ¶RIWKH
Chamber (art 114 of the Constitution) once the legislature declares the need for revision. This 
explains why early proposals were advanced by opposition parties with hopes of winning the 
elections following the process of dissolution. The new procedure (see Online Appendix), which 
follows from the process of European integration, is less rigid, requires votes during the same 
legislative term and overall provides more incentives for consensus across parties. 
 
Conclusion and implications 
 
This article addressed the question of why contemporary constitutions regulate political parties. It 
introduced a framework for analysis that consists of actors involved in the process, their interests 
and justifications. Although the outcome of regulation conveys µSXEOLF¶JRRGVSDUWLHValso want 
µSULYDWH¶EHQHILWVIURPUHJXODWLRQDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWVXEVLGLHVUHVWULFWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQIURP
anti-system parties, role distinctioQIURPµULYDOV¶DQGJXDUDQWHHVDJDLQVWDQ\PLVXVHRISRZHU 
 
  
Empirically, to illustrate the framework, this article considered the case of Luxembourg, which 
provides a window into the process of constitutional regulation of parties. The empirical evidence 
illustrates the interplay between political parties, national institutions and international actors and 
their various justifications for party constitutional regulation. The analysis of the actual outcome 
of party constitutionalisation in 2008 provided valid support for Proposition 1, whereas the 
earlier, unadopted proposals of the opposition provide support for Proposition 3. The 
constitutional justification of parties as public utilities has prevailed over the need to extensively 
regulate them to defend democracy as the opposition would have preferred.  
 
The propositions outlined in the framework depict alternative paths for future processes of party 
constitutional regulation in countries without parties in their constitutions or paths for amending 
previous constitutional provisions. In Hungary, for example, the 2011 constitutional amendments 
LQFOXGHGWKHUHPRYDORIDSUHYLRXVDUWDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKµQRVLQJOHSDUW\PD\H[HUFLVH
exclusive control of a government body¶ (Party law in modern Europe, 2014). This change 
towards removing restrictions was clearly in accordance with the interests of the governing party 
FIDESZ, which had a qualified majority in the parliament at the time. More comparative research 
is needed to test all four propositions advanced in this paper.  
 
First, the implications of the contemporary constitutional regulation of parties are related to the 
increased importance and recognition of parties as indispensable agents of democracy as stated by 
Schattschneider (1942). Second, the constitutional regulation notes the transformation of political 
parties and their entrenchment in state institutions. Third, the constitutionalisation is increasingly 
under the influence of external forces, which suggests that, to a certain degree, contemporary 
constitutionalism does indeed extend beyond the state. Constitutionalisation considers 
international practices and can respond to the necessities of the state, as well as to the necessities 
of the national and international political actors.  
  
 
Notes: 
µELV¶IURP/DWLQµVHFRQGGRXEOH¶VLPSO\SODFHVWKHDPHQGPHQWEHWZHHQDUWLFOHDQGDUWLFOHRIWKHH[LVWLQJ
constitution. 
2 Article 4 of the current French constitution has a similar text with the adopted amendment. For details, see Party 
Law in Modern Europe Project Database. 
$VUHFRUGHGE\WKHDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWKDPHPEHURIWKH&RXQFLORI6WDWH/X[HPERXUJ)HEUXDU\ 
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TABLES  
 
Table 1. General framework of constitutional regulation of political parties 
Justification 
 Agency 
Legitimation 
(j1) 
Organizational 
survival 
(j2) 
Role distinction 
IURPµULYDOV¶ 
(j3) 
Restrict 
competition 
to democratic 
parties (j4) 
 Prevent misuse 
of power 
(j5) 
 Administrative 
legal  
necessity 
(j6) 
 
Positions of 
political 
actors 
 
Individual 
(parties) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Collective 
(National 
institutions) 
Yes No Yes No  Yes  Yes 
External  
(non-state) 
Yes No No No  Yes  Yes 
model of 
constitutional 
regulation 
 
 Public utilities Public Office Defending democracy 
 
Proposition    Proposition 1  Proposition 2   Proposition 3   
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Whilst the real interests of parties cannot be entirely gauged through interviews and the 
examination of parliamentary debates, the analysis presented in this paper rests with the 
justifications brought forward by all actors involved in the process of amending the constitution.  
Specific justifications were identified in official institutional responses to proposals of revision 
(see table 1). These responses were issued by individual and collective national and international 
actors, in the parliamentary debates specially organised for this purpose. Generally, they took the 
form of position papers/opinions. Additionally, they were cross validated by face to face 
interviews with Luxembourgish political elite.  
 
The process of constitutional revision is led by the Commission on Institutions and Constitutional 
Affairs (Gerkrath 2013), whose members represent all party groups. Their discussions are 
influenced by the position paper of the government and the advisory opinion of the Council of 
State and the Venice Commission. Since 2003, the Commission brings the proposal into the 
plenary session of the Chamber where modifications to the constitution are agreed by two-thirds 
majority. 
 
Table 1. Examples of justifications  
Type of 
justification 
([DPSOHRIDFWRU¶VSRVLWLRQ 
Agency 
legitimation 
µ,I SDUWLHV GLG QRW H[LVW DQG WKHUH ZHUH RQO\ FDQGLGDWH OLVWV WKLV ZRXOG HQG XS LQ
limiting the link between the voters and the people WKH\YRWHGIRU¶%UD] 
µ7KHLQVWLWXWLRQDOOHJLWLPDWLRQWKDWSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVFDQDFTXLUHZLWKDUWLFOHELVZLOO
SHUPLW WKHP WR LQIOXHQFH DQG WR HVWDEOLVK D IRUPDO OLQNDJH ZLWK WKHLU¶
GHSXWLHV¶6FKPLW 
Organizational 
survival 
µ&RQVLGHULQJ WKH FUXFLDO UROH SDUWLHV DQG SROLWLFDO JURXSV SOD\ LQ WKH IRUPDWLRQ DQG
expression of popular will, their financing needs to be assured essentially through 
SXEOLFPHDQV¶&KDPEUHGHV'HSXWHVF 
µ,Q WKH DEVHQFH RI SXEOLF ILQDQFH SROLWical parties can hardly cover their expenses 
from cotizations, one cannot increase the cotizations without risking to exclude the 
OHDVWIRUWXQDWHPHPEHUV¶&RQVHLOG¶(WDW 
Role distinction µ1HYHUWKHOHVV DQG WKLV GLIIHUHQWLDWHV SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV IURP other organizations, they 
do play an important role in our system of institutions¶%RGU\ 
µ2QHKDVWRDYRLGSODFLQJSROLWLFDOJURXSVDWWKHVDPHOHYHORILPSRUWDQFHDVSROLWLFDO
SDUWLHV¶&KDPEUHGHV'HSXWHVE 
Restrict 
competition from 
anti-democratic 
parties 
µ0U $VVHOERUQ VWLSXODWHV WKDW &RQVWLWXWLRQV ZKLFK PHQWLRQ SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV VKRXOG
include a stipulation requiring their internal structure and functioning must be 
GHPRFUDWLF¶&KDPEUHGHV'HSXWHV 
¶¶,I WKH µ&RQVWLWXWLRQ JXDUDQWHHV WKH IUHHGRPV RI SDUWLHV DQG SROLWLFDO JURXSV¶ VXFK
GLVSRVLWLRQFDQDOVROHJLWLPDWHH[WUHPLVWSDUWLHV«WKHUHYLVLRQFDQHYHQWXDOO\VD\WKDW
SDUWLHV DQG  JURXSV DUH WKH H[SUHVVLRQ RI GHPRFUDWLF SOXUDOLVP¶¶ &KDPEUH GHV
Deputes 2004a: 5)                                                                                                                         
Prevent misuse of 
power 
µIf political parties are free to form and function, they must respect the Constitution 
DQGWKHODZV¶&KDPEUHGHV'HSXWHVE 
 
 µ2QHcannot exclude the possibility of a political party to undertake a radical reform, 
DV ORQJ DV LW LV FRPSOHWHG ZKLOH UHVSHFWLQJ GHPRFUDWLF SULQFLSOHV¶&KDPEUH GHV
Deputes 2001:2)   
Administrative 
legal necessity 
µ«WKHLQFOXVLRQRISROLWLFDOSDUWLHVLQWKe Constitution is linked with other juridical 
questions such as the juridical status of political parties and political groups, the 
required criteria for being recognized as parties or political groups, or for example the 
juridical responsibilities of members and representatives of parties and political 
JURXSV«¶&KDPEUHGHV'HSXWHV 
  
Table 2. Constitutional amendment proposals in Luxembourg  
 
Source: a. Chambre des Deputes (2001, 2002b, 2004b, 2007c); b. each proposal was associated with a constitutionalization model following the content analysis coding 
procedure used by the Party Law in Modern Europe Project (2014); 
 
 
  
Proponent 
/incumbency status 
OPPOSITION PARTIES GOVERNING PARTIES 
Wording of 
proposalsa 
µ3DUWLHVRUSROLWLFDOJURXSV
express democratic pluralism. 
They contribute to the formation 
of popular will and the 
expression of universal suffrage. 
They form and freely exercise 
their activity under the respect 
RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKHODZ¶
(2001 Asselborn, LSAP 
proposal, not adopted) 
 
 
µ3DUWLHVDQG political 
groups contribute to the 
formation of popular will 
and to its expression 
through universal 
suffrage. They form and 
exercise their activity 
freely. They have to 
respect the principle of 
national sovereignty and 
GHPRFUDF\¶ 
(2002 ADR proposal, not 
adopted) 
µPolitical Parties and political 
groups express democratic 
pluralism and contribute to the 
formation of popular will and are a 
fundamental instrument of political 
participation. They form and act 
freely under the respect of the 
constitution and the law. Their 
internal structure and functioning 
should be democratic. The statute, 
organisation and finance of 
political parties are regulated by 
ODZ¶5LSSLQJHU'3
proposal, not adopted)  
 
µPolitical parties and 
political groups 
express democratic 
pluralism and 
contribute to the 
formation of popular 
will and to the 
expression of 
XQLYHUVDOVXIIUDJH¶
(2004 Asselborn, 
LSAP proposal, not 
adopted) 
 
µ3ROLWLFDl parties 
contribute to the 
formation of the 
popular will and the 
expression of 
universal suffrage. 
They express 
democratic 
SOXUDOLVP¶(2007 
Asselborn, LSAP 
proposal adopted) 
 
Dominant 
Justifications 
Agency legitimation 
 
Prevent misuse of power  Prevent misuse of power 
 
Agency legitimation 
 
Agency legitimation 
 
Model of 
constitutionalizationb 
Parties as Public utilities 
(Proposition1) 
 
Defending democracy 
(Proposition 3) 
Defending democracy 
(Proposition3) 
Parties as Public 
utilities 
(Proposition1) 
Parties as Public 
utilities 
(Proposition1) 
  
Reference:  
Gerkrath, Jörg (2013) Some Remarks on the Pending Constitutional Change in the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourgh. European Public Law 19(3): 449-460. 
 
 
 
 
 
